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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the configuration, structural properties, development and 
effects of the interorganizational network structures induced by the regional cooperation 
with the EU in the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy initiatives on 
governance in the Russian northwestern and southern regions. The empirical evidence 
indicates that the northwestern region is more prone to sub-national integration with the 
EU and regional cooperation with the EU is more efficient, has stronger effects on 
regional governance patterns, and generates higher levels of social capital in the 
northwestern region than in the southern region due to horizontal differentiation and 
higher degree of decentralization, cohesion, intersectoral interaction, and intensity of 
cooperative effort in the northwestern regional interorganizational governance structures.  
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Introduction 
 
Academic debate on EU external relations has mainly been focused on EU’s 
capacity to export its norms and standards beyond its borders within the different legal 
frameworks, such as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, Stabilization and 
Association Agreements, or European Neighborhood Policy. Very little research has been 
devoted to the analysis of the character, the degree, and the effects of EU involvement in 
domestic governance structures of its neighboring countries as well as to the internal 
factors that would account for the resistance to or acceptance of EU norms. Moreover, 
studies of EU-related democratization processes and acquisition of norms of good 
governance in the EU neighboring countries are mostly concerned with national-level 
changes and countries exhibiting authoritarian tendencies (e.g. Russia or Belarus) are often 
considered to be impervious to EU influences.  
Focusing on the EU-Russia sub-national cooperation, this paper addresses this gap 
in the literature by offering an explanation of how the networks among regional public, 
civil society, and private-sector actors involved in the EU sponsored projects and 
cooperation initiatives with the European actors can generate social capital, build support 
for democracy among local and regional actors, and improve governance in the 
neighboring countries at the sub-national level, even when national-level conditions are 
not favorable for EU influences. The paper also outlines factors that inhibit or catalyze 
EU-related transformations.   
After a short theoretical reflection on the peculiarities of the EU-Russia center-to-
center and sub-national level dynamics and a brief discussion of theoretical models 
relevant to this research, I conduct network analysis of complex regional 
interorganizational systems in the Russian northwestern and southern regions to explore 
the embeddedness of the regions in the EU-related structures, examine the strength of 
cooperative efforts, identify the key actors of cooperation with the EU and analyze their 
propensity to influence decision-making processes in the regions. I also examine regional 
actors’ resource attributes that affect their structural network positions and help to explain 
the evolution and the development of the regional systems.  
 
Peculiarities of the EU-Russia center-to-center and sub-national level dynamics and 
theoretical models for regional cooperation 
 
It is generally assumed that Russia will not be able to benefit from the 
democratization processes related to the European integration and the enlargement of the 
European Union due to the lack of the EU conditionality as it is not an EU candidate 
country and will not become one in the foreseeable future. 
Additionally, scholars of the EU-Russia relations have primarily focused on the 
analysis of the center-to-center dynamics arguing that Russia is not and will not be part of 
the EU integration as both sides are ambivalent about the desirability of deepening their 
relationship due to serious mistrust problems (Roberts, 2006; Trenin, 2005; Emerson, 
2005). Among the factors affecting the relations between the two parties scholars mention 
Russia’s new assertiveness as a regional power and its dissatisfaction with the way the EU 
is imposing its norms and values on its large neighborhood, and the EU’s dissatisfaction 
with Russia’s coercive energy policy, politics in the Caucasus, and lack of commitment to 
economic diversification and eroding democracy.  
However, despite strained relations between Moscow and Brussels, interaction 
between the two sides at the sub-national level has grown substantially in both depth and   3
scope (Stoliarova, 2007; Obydenkova, 2006; Lankina and Getachew, 2006; Prozorov, 
2004). Russian provinces have been actively interacting with the EU institutions, member-
states and regions of member-states in various projects and programs under the EU-Russia 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the EU’s TACIS (Technical Assistance to 
CIS countries), ENPI (European Neighborhood and Partnership), and CBC (Cross-Border 
Cooperation Program) instruments. In addition to the EU-sponsored programs, Russian 
regional actors have been involved in a multitude of inter-regional economic, social, 
cultural, and educational partnerships and cooperation initiatives with different European 
actors. Very few studies have been concerned with the assessment of these sub-national 
cooperation processes. This paper argues that with a strong focus on the Moscow- 
Brussels relations some important changes occurring at sub-national level might have been 
overlooked.  
There are several theoretical models that are relevant for the research on the EU-
Russia regional cooperation. However, their thorough investigation is not the main 
purpose of this study; rather they are provided for better conceptualization of the regional 
cooperation and sub-national integration phenomena.  
First, certain aspects of the Europeanization theory (Morlino, 2002; Cowles, 
Caporasso, Risse 2001) can be applied to this analysis. According to the Europeanization 
framework, sub-national integration with the EU may cause change at the domestic level 
as the regional cooperation networks between the Russian regional actors and European 
regional, national and supranational actors can allow for the gradual transfer of the EU 
democratic norms and values into the domestic sub-national politics.  
Second, consideration of EU external governance models (Lavenex, 2008, 2004; 
Klitsounova, 2007; Tiirmaa-Klaar, 2006; Noutcheva, Emerson, 2005) can be helpful in 
understanding the EU’s involvement in the regional decision-making processes through 
the modes of horizontal interaction between the EU and the Russian actors.  
Third, the aspects of the theory of regionalization (Obydenkova, 2006; 
Makarychev, 2000) stipulating that regions bordering foreign countries are prone to 
external influences can be helpful in explaining the development of the sub-national 
regionalism between the EU and the regions of Russia bordering the EU.   
Fourth, Lankina and Getachew’s (2006) geographic incremental theory of 
democratization is useful in connecting the EU’s external influence factor to internal sub-
national democratization processes. The scholars conducted case studies of EU’s 
involvement and statistical analysis of openness and democracy levels in Russia’s regions, 
and found out that the EU’s aid and a region’s geographic location are significant factors 
in explaining variation in democracy at the sub-national level. Therefore, according to the 
scholars, regions that are closer to the EU and that are primary recipients of the EU aid 
tend to be more pro-democratically developed than other regions. However, besides aid 
programs there are all kinds of inter-regional partnerships and initiatives between the EU 
and Russian regional actors that can not be regarded simply as ‘aid’ projects as they have 
multiple sources of funding coming both from the EU and the Russian sides (national, 
regional, and municipal budgets, regional intergovernmental organizations, and private 
sector) and are established to the mutual benefit of participating parties.  
Obydenkova (2006) explored cooperation between Europe and the regions of 
Russia (she applied the term ‘transnational regional cooperation’) and examined factors 
that explain the level of integration of a region in European politics and also factors that 
explain the establishment and the development of the transnational regional cooperation 
and found the geographical factor less important in explaining regional development and 
the emergence of transnational regional cooperation.    4
While several studies explored the factors explaining the emergence of the sub-
national regionalism, very little research has been devoted to the factors that explain the 
level of engagement of the sub-national units in the regional cooperation and the character, 
the degree, and the effects of the regional cooperation on the domestic sub-national social, 
political, and economic infrastructures. Additionally, very few studies have been 
concerned with the exact structural mechanisms, through which regional cooperation 
processes influence democracy and governance at the sub-national level.  
This study addresses these issues on the basis of the two regions, Russian 
northwestern and southern regions, that are included in the regional dimensions of the EU 
foreign policy- Northern Dimension (ND) and the Black Sea Synergy (BSS), respectively. 
The ND and the BSS initiatives complement already existing regional cooperation policies 
of the EU (like TACIS and ENPI) and the EU member states in the regions and 
specifically focus political attention at the regional level. These regional cooperation 
initiatives address the specific challenges and opportunities arising in the regions and 
represent intensified inter-regional and transnational regional cooperation between the EU, 
its member states, and the regions of the member-states, and the neighboring countries and 
the regions of those countries.
1 Both initiatives aim at developing regional networking and 
include a multitude of regional actors by covering a wide range of sectors, such as 
transport, the environment, justice and home affairs, cooperation in the field of culture, 
health care, nongovernmental cooperation and civil society development, the promotion of 
trade and investment, economy, business and infrastructure, cross-border cooperation, 
information technology, science, education and research. The initiatives are financed from 
multiple sources including budgets of individual countries and regions of participating 
countries (both Russian and the EU), EU financial instruments, international financial 
institutions (e.g. European Bank for Reconstruction and development (EBRD), European 
Investment Bank (EIB), Nordic Investment Bank (NIB)), and the private sector.  
Administratively speaking, Russian northwestern and southern provinces that are 
involved in the BSS and ND initiatives have a status of the so called ‘border regions’, 
therefore they have special bilateral agreements with the federal government granting 
them considerable autonomy in pursuing intense international and inter-regional 
cooperation with foreign actors (Gella, 2007; Prozorov, 2004). Thus internally, the 
northwestern and southern regions have similar legal conditions in respect to their ability 
to engage in international activity.  
It is interesting that according to different analyses, the northwestern region of 
Russia is much deeper involved in the European integration and is more advanced in terms 
of democratic governance than the southern region from economic and political openness 
and transparency and accountability of institutions, to provincial government strength and 
independence and the level of maturity of civil society and social capital (Petrov, 2005; 
Lankina and Getachew, 2006). Variation in the structure, the intensity, and the effects of 
the regional cooperation with the EU might be a significant factor explaining these 
regional differences.   
 
 
 
                                                 
1 For more information on the Northern Dimension, see  
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/ 
   For more information on the Black Sea Synergy, see    
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/blacksea/index_en.htm   5
Regional cooperation networks in the Russian northwestern and southern regions 
 
Network Perspective 
 
Regional cooperation framework creates an opportunity structure that provides 
economic, social, and cultural benefits and geographical mobility for various organizations, 
companies, educational institutions, firms, and provincial government bodies in the 
Russian northwestern and southern regions. Therefore, different regional actors voluntarily 
enter this structure and deliberately choose to use the resources offered by it: additional 
financial support and an opportunity to make partners, improve information processing 
capabilities, lower uncertainty and reduce transaction costs, learn more about regional 
environment by establishing strong contacts and socializing with diverse regional actors, 
and occupy a prominent position in the region by becoming connected to important actors 
in the regional socio-economic, cultural and political arenas.  
Complex interactions among different regional actors in the EU-Russia regional 
cooperation dimension form interorganizational networks. For the purpose of this study, 
regional cooperation network can be defined as a structure consisting of agents (or 
nodes/actors) represented by all kinds of cultural, educational, economic, civil society, and 
public-sector actors and links among the agents- complex interactions through EU 
programs and regional projects, partnerships, and cooperation initiatives with the 
European actors. Regional cooperation networks represent a peculiar form of regional 
network governance as interdependent interconnected private, public, and civil society 
actors cooperate in a more or less institutionalized infrastructure to address common 
regional problems – environmental, social, economic, cultural, and other, which in most 
cases transcend the borders of single provincial governments.  
Consideration of the structural properties and the evolution of the northwestern and 
southern regional cooperation networks is important for understanding the strength, 
effectiveness and development of the EU-Russia regional cooperation and its effects on 
the social, political, and economic activity in the northwestern and southern regions. 
Therefore, the main questions for this study are:  
  Are there any differences in the configuration and functioning of the southern and 
northwestern interorganizational infrastructures induced by the EU-Russia regional 
cooperation? 
  What effects do these differences have on the regional governance and social 
infrastructures? 
  What structural factors account for the difference in the levels of democratic 
governance and involvement of the northwestern and southern regions in the 
European integration? 
It is hypothesized that there are significant differences in the configuration of the 
northwestern and southern regional cooperation networks that help explain why the 
northwestern region is deeper involved in European integration and is more advanced in 
terms of democratic governance than the southern region.     
Structuralist perspective presupposes that the structural position of agents in the set 
of relations they maintain explains the patterns of their behavior, the constraints and the 
opportunities emerging for them in the system, and influences the probability of achieving 
some goals (Jackson, 2008; Semitiel García, 2006; Burt, 2000). According to Semitiel 
García (2006, p.8), ‘from a methodological point of view, the network perspective is not 
reductionist but holistic, as opposed to individualistic, and interdisciplinary; …actors are 
purposeful, intentional agents, with social and economic motivations, and their actions are   6
influenced by the net of relations in which they are embedded’. Social network analysis 
scholars argue that complex interactions among network agents create structural 
interdependences among them, and agents have a capacity to impact each other through 
these interdependencies (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Granovetter 2005). Therefore, 
network linkages have important consequences for all the network actors: the relationships 
a given actor has with others in the system affect its perceptions, norms, beliefs, values, 
visions, ideas, and behavior. 
Network structures and substructures can be rigorously analyzed using a set of 
network analysis tools, which are uniquely designed to confront specific research 
questions of interest. Social network analysis is characterized by a distinctive 
methodology encompassing techniques for collecting data, statistical analysis, visual 
representation, etc. Depending on the focus of research and the level of analysis, scholars 
study structural attributes and characteristics of ego-networks (a focal node (ego) and the 
nodes to whom ego is directly connected to plus the ties among them), or network clusters, 
or structural features of the whole networks (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003).   
This study is focused on the analysis of the network-level characteristics of the 
EU-Russia regional cooperation systems, since the main aim of the study is to compare 
whole interorganizational systems in the Russian northwestern and southern regions and 
examine structural factors that explan the regional differences. Over the past decade, there 
has been a steady increase in the number of studies focusing on whole interorganizational 
networks; however, network-level research has primarily been theoretical or based on 
descriptive case studies performed at single point in time (Provan, Fish and Sydow, 2007). 
This study contributes to the interorganizational network literature by conducting an 
empirical longitudinal study of the northwestern and southern regional cooperation 
networks.  
 
Modeling the regional cooperation networks 
 
Representative samples of one hundred regional actors in each region were 
selected for this study. The actors were selected from 8 provinces in the Russian 
Northwestern Federal District and 9 provinces in the Russian Southern Federal District 
that are included in the EU’s Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy regional 
initiatives and are covered by the majority of regional cooperation programs, projects and 
partnerships.
1 
The actors selected for the analysis include provincial administrations existing in 
the regions, economic and business actors, various non-governmental organizations and 
associations and other third-sector actors, educational institutions, local newspapers and 
media agencies, environmental organizations, and other regional actors participating in the 
regional cooperation with the EU. The data on the organizations were taken from multiple 
sources: EU TACIS, ENPI, and CBC reports, EU regional project databases, EU regional 
cooperation reports, the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Synergy resources and 
reports, Euroregion’s websites, Russian regional actors’ archives and websites 
                                                 
1 The Northwestern selected province: St. Petersburg (Leningrad) oblast, Novgorod oblast, Vologda oblast, 
Arhangelsk oblast (excluding Nenets Autonomous District), Pskov oblast, Republic of Karelia, Murmansk 
oblast, and Kaliningrad oblast 
The Southern selected provinces: Rostov oblast, Astrakhan oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai, Republic 
of Adygeya, Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Karachaevo-Cherkessk Republic, Republic of Kalmykiya, 
Republic of North Osetia   7
(information on European partners),  websites of provincial governments, and different 
local and regional newspapers, journals, and brochures.
1  
The organizations were selected in a way that each sector of the regional 
cooperation was represented by a more or less equal number of organizations. In addition, 
the samples were also composed of more or less equal number of private and third-sector 
actors. Due to the geographical peculiarity of the regional cooperation, in the northwestern 
region there are important Northern Europe –related organizations like the Office of the 
Nordic Council of Ministers, Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute, and Regional 
Support Bureau, which were included in the analysis as a separate block as they are 
involved in several areas of the regional cooperation– economic, social, civil society, 
environmental and educational. Additionally, compared to the multitude projects aimed at 
improving transportation systems between northwestern Russia and Northern Europe, 
there were only two transportation cooperation initiatives in the southern region in 1999, 
and they were primarily concerned with improving sea-line roots for trade and economic 
cooperation; therefore, organizations participating in those projects were not included as a 
separate entity, but as part of the economic and business sector of the regional cooperation. 
The literature on interorganizational network analysis mentions several ways of 
measuring relationships between organizations. Certain studies favor measuring the 
strength of the tie between two organizations in a network on the basis of a three-point, 
five-point, seven-point, or nine-point scale, where the highest number corresponds to the 
strongest alliance (Singer and Kegler, 2004; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). Some studies measure network relations 
with binary data representing the presence (1) or absence (0) of a relationship (Rowley, 
Behrens and Krackhardt, 2000). Some studies use the measure of frequency of interaction; 
this is usually calculated as the number of transactions occurring per unit of time 
(Kalleberg, Knoke, and Marsden, 1995). Other studies interpret the intensity of the 
network tie as the intensity of interaction through the joint activities, projects, or events 
held together or the number of partnerships existing between two actors, which reflects the 
degree to which an actor has relationships with other actors through a number of joint 
activities linking them together (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Soh, 2003).  
This study follows the last approach to measuring the strength of a network tie and 
applies normalization to achieve consistency in dynamic range for the set of data. 
Therefore, the strength of the relationship between two network actors is measured by the 
normalized intensity of interaction through cooperative effort– the number of EU-related 
regional cooperation projects/initiatives/programs/activities that existed between two 
                                                 
1   For information on Tacis, see http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/; For ENPI 
programs, see http://www.together50years.eu/EN/mn3_hr/enpi.htm; For information on the Northern 
Dimension initiatives, see http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/index.htm; For information 
of the Black Sea programs, see http://www.blacksea-bc.net/index.php?page=MAP;  
For information on the neighborhood initiatives, see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_647.htm; For 
information on cooperation partnerships, see http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_258.htm; For external 
cooperation programs, see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-
cross-border/index_en.htm; For Euroregions, see http://www.siauliai.aps.lt/saule/about.html, 
 http://www.euroregionbaltic.eu/members.php, http://euregio.karelia.ru/site/?lang=eng 
Baltic Euroregion Network http://www.benproject.org/en, For the information about regional partnerships, 
see the websites of the provincial governments and regional and local newspapers 
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actors divided by the total number of cooperative efforts in the system. The normalized 
intensity of interaction through cooperative effort is an adequate measure of 
interorganizational relations in the regional cooperation systems, as the whole concept of 
regional cooperation is based on cooperative measures that help to link different regional 
actors together and form regional alliances.  
The data on the strength of the network ties corresponds to the actual cooperative 
effort in the northwestern and southern systems. In many cases, besides the actors 
enumerated in official program design documents, other regional actors were involved in 
the implementation of cooperation programs/initiatives/partnerships/projects/events and it 
was important to consider them in the analysis. For instance, in the southern region it 
sometimes happened that provincial administrations were not mentioned in the project 
design documentation; however, in practice they took active part in the project by making 
decisions concerning public events designed by the project, or/and subjecting project 
finances to bureaucratic control, or making decisions concerning actors that should be 
involved/excluded from the project, or participating in project activities at different stages 
of project implementation. Or, as another example, many initiatives that were primarily 
designed for establishing cooperation among various economic actors included civil 
society actors, like in the case with the joint EU /Finnish /Swedish/ Russian Development 
Program (northwestern region) called ‘Euro-Russia regional development’, which was 
designed to improve the investment conditions and networking of companies across the 
border between Russia and the EU through investment projects. Many actors from other 
sectors like Northwestern Association of Workers, Russian Institute for Radio Navigation 
and various environmental organizations were involved in the implementation of the 
program. It also sometimes happened that actors that were initially included in the project 
design documents did not participate or withdrew from the 
program/initiative/partnership/project at the early stage of its implementation for different 
reasons.  
Therefore, the information on project participants was verified through multiple 
sources including program evaluations, project intermediate and final reports, local 
newspapers, provincial websites, organizations’ websites and reports, and any information 
available on project events. Thus, the data on the relations between actors in the systems 
corresponds to the actual activities in the regions. 
At first, two-mode cooperation program/initiative/partnership/project by 
organization matrix was constructed for each region at time 1 (1999), when the majority of 
cooperation programs were already taking place since all sorts of regional partnerships in 
addition to already existing TACIS programs were launched in 1997 under the PCA 
agreement, and some of the regional business and economic contacts were established 
even before 1997; and then at time 2 (2006), when the latest consistent data on the 
regional cooperation were available. Then these four two-mode matrixes were converted 
into four square matrixes (actor by actor).  The resulting matrixes represent valued graphs, 
where the strength of relationships is measured by the normalized intensity of interaction 
through cooperative effort.  The data in the matrixes was symmetrized due to its reciprocal 
character. 
The resulting matrixes were then converted into UCINET, NETDRAW and 
MATLAB files and analyzed with UCINET, NETDRAW and MATLAB tools and 
techniques.
 1 The combination of these programs was necessary for the strength of the 
                                                 
1 UCINET is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social network data as well as other 1-mode and 
2-mode data. The program is capable of reading and writing a multitude of differently formatted text files, as   9
analysis, as each of the programs has its own advantages and disadvantages in measuring 
network characteristics and parameters.            
 
Analysis of the northwestern and southern regional cooperation networks 
 
Network Centralization 
 
While collaboration has become common in different areas, there are few methods 
to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of cooperative initiatives. In the 
interorganizational field, network analysis can rigorously assess the degree to which and 
by whom information and other resources are exchanged in the network (Valente and 
Davis, 1999; Provan and Milward, 1995). For that reason, network analysis is the widely 
preferred method for evaluating the evolution and effectiveness of cooperative 
partnerships (Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 2007). Network analysis provides statistical 
measures of intensity of cooperative efforts within a network and the degree to which all 
the actors of the network have equal access to network exchanges and opportunities. 
It is generally argued that effective network governance and effective functioning 
of interorganizational networks depends on the degree of network decentralization 
(Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 2007; Joas, Kern, and Sandberg, 2007; Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti, 1995; Putnam, 1993). Decentralization is associated with more 
efficient information flows, greater knowledge and advance intelligence of possible 
changes in cooperation structures (Zmerli and Newton, 2007). Decentralization and 
participation strengthen governance and build social capital in society (Narayan, 1999). 
Network centralization in network analysis measures the degree to which an entire 
network is focused around a few central nodes (Scott, 2000) or ‘dominated by a few 
places’ (Irwin and Huges, 1992). Most central actors in governance networks are those 
who have important decision-making and coordinative roles; they are key to understanding 
the circulation of ideas and information in the network and network performance, in 
general. From governance perspective, centrality deduces the type of governance network 
from whether the network is dominated by public, private, or civil society decision makers 
(John and Cole, 1998). According to Scott (2000), actors have higher centrality to the 
extent they can gain access to and/or influence over others. Centralization affects the 
spread of information, ideas and practices in a network as central nodes have more 
influence and control over how information, resources and practices spread to others and 
in most cases, given the position of control and power, act as bottlenecks and slow 
diffusion (Tanjasiri, Tran, Palmer, Valente, 2007; Valente, 1995).  
Another important negative feature of centralization is that if the central nodes in a 
centralized network are removed or damaged, the network quickly fragments into 
unconnected sub-networks (Krebs, 2008). A network centralized around a well connected 
                                                                                                                                                   
well as Excel files. It can handle a maximum of 32,767 nodes (actors). The analysis methods include 
centrality measures, subgroup identification, role analysis, elementary graph theory, and permutation-based 
statistical analysis. In addition, the program has strong matrix analysis routines, such as matrix algebra and 
multivariate statistics. For more information, please see http://www.analytictech.com/ucinet.htm 
NETDRAW is a program written by Steve Borgatti for visualizing both 1-mode and 2-mode social network 
data. It can handle multiple relations at the same time, and can use node attributes to set colors, shapes, and 
sizes of nodes. 
MATLAB is a numerical computing environment and programming language. Maintained by The 
MathWorks, MATLAB allows easy matrix manipulation, plotting of functions and data, implementation of 
algorithms, creation of user interfaces, and interfacing with programs in other languages. 
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group can fail abruptly if that group is disabled or removed. In governance networks 
highly central nodes can hurt a network if they are pursuing their own agenda. A less 
centralized network is considered a much better structure for cooperative efforts, since it 
has no single points of failure and it is resilient in the face of many intentional attacks or 
random failures as many actors or links can fail while allowing the remaining actors to still 
reach each other over other network paths (Krebs, 2008).  
Therefore, centralization helps to measure how resilient cooperation networks are 
and how effective cooperation processes are in terms of equitable sharing of information, 
resources, and influence and distribution of decision-making power among network actors. 
Network centralization can be measured by means of UCINET program. The 
eigenvector approach is used to measure centralization of the regional cooperation 
networks, as it takes into account the entire pattern in the network. Unlike other centrality 
measures that weigh every contact equally, eigenvector measure assigns relative scores to 
all network agents based on the principle that linkages to high-scoring agents contribute 
more to the score of the agent in question than equal linkages to low-scoring nodes 
(Bonacich, 2007). 
Figures 1 and 2 represent regional cooperation networks visualized in NETDRAW 
at time 1 (1999) and Figures 3 and 4 depict networks at time 2 (2006). Table 1 reports the 
networks’ centralization indexes calculated by the eigenvector routine and Tables 2 and 3 
report centrality scores for 10 most central network actors.   
 
-Figure 1 here- 
-Figure 2 here- 
-Figure 3 here- 
-Figure 4 here- 
-Table 1 here- 
-Table 2 here- 
-Table 3 here- 
 
The results of the analysis indicate important differences in the structural 
composition and evolutionary development of the regional cooperation systems. In 1999, 
the southern regional cooperation network appeared to be two times more centralized than 
the northwestern network (61.32% compared to 32.17%) implying higher inequality in the 
distribution of information, resources and decision-making power among the network 
actors. In 2006, the southern network remained highly centralized (59.58%), while the 
northwestern network developed into a decentralized system (15.22%) compared to 
previous 32.17%) indicating much more equitable sharing of network resources and 
influence among the network actors.   
The results of the analysis demonstrate that in the 1999 southern cooperation 
network provincial administrations hold ‘global’ network central positions, which implies 
that they are the most influential network actors in the regional cooperation processes. 
Moreover, cooperation activity seems to occur most intensely within provinces and there 
is the lack of inter-provincial interorganizational linkages.  Rostov, Krasnodar, Stavropol 
provinces and the republic of Adygeya seem to have some interconnectedness, while 
cooperative activity in the republic of Karachaevo- Cherkessia and Astrakhan province is 
largely isolated from the other provinces.  
The 2006 southern regional cooperation network remains highly centralized around 
provincial governments. The number of inter-provincial interorganizational linkages 
increased, implying that more actors operating in different provinces established   11
cooperative contacts; however, actors from the republic of Karachaevo- Cherkessia and 
Astrakhan province remain quite isolated from the rest of cooperative structure. It is 
important to note that actors from the journalism sector form a cohesive cooperative 
alliance close to the center of the network, while in 1999 they were largely isolated from 
each other. The same holds true for the social sector actors. This means that in the 
centralized interorganizational system where control and power positions are occupied by 
the public sector actors, these actors try to find their own niche of influence and act 
strategically to benefit from the network exchanges.  
Additionally, in the 2006 network centrality indexes of provincial administrations 
increased while indexes of many other actors decreased implying that the whole system 
became more asymmetrical. Big standard deviations for centrality measures (both in 1999 
and 2006) show that in the southern cooperation network control, power and influence are 
unequally distributed in the system as there is a big difference between highly centralized 
and highly peripheral actors. Highly peripheral actors in the southern regional cooperation 
network are highly constrained by the limited access to other actors and network 
information and resources. 
In contrast with the southern network, the center of the 1999 northwestern network 
is shared by organizations coming from various sectors: economic, education and science, 
social sector, culture, journalism, and public sector; though overall, economic and business 
actors prevail in the central positions and perform ‘connector-function’, as many of the 
interorganizational linkages among different sectors go through economic and business 
actors. As far as public sector is concerned, St. Petersburg and Novgorod province 
administrations and administration of the republic of Karelia are more influential in 
regional cooperation processes than the other administrations. Additionally, important 
actors in the regional cooperation processes are organizations specifically focused on the 
integration of the northwestern region with Europe: the Office of the Nordic Council of 
Ministers, Finnish Cultural and Academic Institute, Regional Support Bureau, and 
Austrian Cooperation Bureau KulturKontakt. Another important feature of the 
northwestern network is that many interorganizational linkages transcend the geographic 
boundaries of single provinces, implying that organizations from different provinces 
extensively cooperate with each other.  
While in the 1999 northwestern network cooperative effort is largely segmented 
into collaboration areas and economic actors prevail in the core of the network, in the 
2006 network the composition of the cooperative effort becomes much more diverse and 
the core of the network is shared by representatives from all the sectors of the regional 
cooperation. These finding go in line with the European integration theories that stipulate 
that economic interaction is the driving force of integration and the spillover effect from 
economic interaction and economic interdependencies will quickly create strong 
incentives for integration in further sectors. Standard deviation figures for centrality 
indexes indicate that there was not a very big difference between most central and least 
central actors in the 1999 northwestern network unlike in the southern cooperation 
network (both in 1999 and 2006), but in the 2006 northwestern network the difference 
became even smaller, which implies more equitable distribution of network resources and 
decision-making power. Another important feature of the 2006 northwestern network is 
that almost all the central actors from the 1999 network conceded their central positions to 
other actors. This indicates strong mobility and adaptability of the northwestern 
cooperation system. 
The results of the centralization analysis indicate significant differences in the 
configuration of the regional cooperation networks in the northwestern and southern   12
regions, which have important implications for the regional integration processes. The 
southern cooperation network appeared to be a highly centralized system with 
asymmetrical distribution of decision-making power and network resources largely 
controlled by the public sector actors. The northwestern network, on the contrary, turned 
out to be much more decentralized, implying more equitable distribution of influence and 
control, and access to network exchanges. Longitudinally speaking, the northwestern 
network showed a tendency toward a further decentralization, while the southern system 
demonstrated little change in the patterns of governance over time.  
 
Network Cohesion 
 
Network cohesion is associated with the level of interconnectedness and 
embeddedness of network actors in the networking structure. High network cohesion is 
important in interorganizational networks, as the degree of network cohesion correlates 
with the levels of trust and social capital in the system (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). 
There are different approaches to characterizing the extent of interconnectedness 
and form of ‘embedding’ of actors in networks. Social network analysts usually use the 
combination of different approaches. The most popular ones are: density, transitivity, and 
compactness. Density is usually defined by the extent that all actors in the network are 
connected. It describes the general level of connectedness and measures the ratio of the 
number of ties that exists in the network to the number of possible ties, if each network 
actor were linked to every other actor (Scott, 2000). Transitivity is associated with the 
existence of all the possible connections in triads.  Interorganizational networks with high 
level of transitivity are considered to be more cohesive, stable, balanced, and harmonious.  
The concept of compactness is based on the ‘distance’ between actors. More compact, or 
cohesive networks, have shorter distances between network actors.  
Tables 4, 5, and 6 report the results of the cohesion analysis.  
 
-Table 4 here- 
-Table 5 here- 
-Table 6 here- 
 
All the measures of network cohesion indicate that the degree of cohesiveness of 
both regional cooperation systems increases over time, however, in the northwestern 
network it increases at a faster pace and the northwestern network is more cohesive than 
the southern one both in 1999 and in 2006. Therefore, the northwestern system generates 
higher levels of trust and social capital.  
Centralization and cohesion analysis indicate that the regional integration 
processes in the northwestern region represent a cohesive, stable and balanced structure 
with equal opportunities for the regional actors and equitable sharing of power, influence 
and control among them. The northwestern cooperation network approximates a good 
network governance model based on self-organization, adaptability, mobility, and 
collective action. In the southern system, public sector actors are dominating cooperation 
and controlling integration processes occurring in the region, while other network actors 
are not very well connected and cooperative effort is largely segmented.  
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Network structural differentiation 
 
Embedding of actors in dyads, triads, clusters, and groups are different ways in 
which the structure of social networks may display ‘texture’, and all of these forms of 
embedded structures in a network speak to the issue of differentiation of network actors 
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This differentiation may have horizontal or vertical nature 
involving unequal rankings or in other words, hierarchy. 
In interorganizational networks a form of vertical differentiation discussed by 
network analysts is structural hierarchy, were the actors might not be subordinate or 
superior to other actors in terms of their actual position, but might be structurally ranked 
being placed at different structural levels of the network, when big distance between these 
levels would indicate structural hierarchy and therefore, significant differences in access to 
decision-making process. Collins (2009) argues that when organizational field is 
characterized by power inequality, interorganizational networks are subordinate to 
dominant actors; however in interorganizational systems network characteristics like 
reciprocity and interdependence can temper vertical differentiation over time. 
Burt’s structural hierarchy method is used for the analysis of structural 
differentiation of the northwestern and southern regional cooperation networks. Figures 5 
and 6 display the results of the analysis.  
 
-Figure 5 here- 
-Figure 6 here- 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that in the southern cooperation network there 
is a relatively big distance between network clusters, which reflects inequality in power 
and barriers to effective network exchanges and information flows. Big distances between 
clusters indicate vertical differentiation of the southern network, while smooth continuous 
placement of nodes in the northwestern networks reflects horizontal differentiation.  
Another important feature of the northwestern network is that the network clusters 
are diverse meaning that they are composed of actors coming from various sectors, 
therefore the decisions are made in diverse collaborative environments. It is possible to 
conclude that northwestern interorganizational governance network involves stable 
horizontal interactions between groups of actors that represent a plurality of organizations. 
The clusters in the southern networks are composed of predominantly same-sector 
actors (especially in 2006 network), which does not contribute to openness and dynamism 
of the system. Therefore, it is possible to make a judgment that the southern cooperation 
network is far from the Putnam’s (1993) ideal of a horizontally structured network with 
equitable sharing of resources and information, where actors are inter-connected and tied 
to one another. 
Intersectoral linkages 
 
Scholars argue that cooperation between different actors (public, private, civil 
society, mass media, etc) is crucial in modern society as it helps to solve intractable 
development problems and builds social capital, which is critical to stability, democracy 
and economic development (Brown and Ashman, 1996). Maloney and Robteutscher 
(2007) argue that for democratic governance there have to be linkages between civil 
society and both the state and the market, as civil society has to ‘mobilize and activate 
influence on state-market mechanisms’.   14
Joas, Kern, and Sandberg (2007) explored transregional cooperation among 
various actors in the Baltic Sea region and found out that participatory decision-making 
and mutual influence were essential for solving important regional problems. According to 
Narayan (1999), interorganizational collaboration networks that contain high number of 
intersectoral cross-cutting ties have better governance capabilities and higher adaptivity to 
evolving complex societal and economic problems.  
EU-Russia regional cooperation aims at solving complex transregional problems in 
the Northern Dimension and the Black Sea Area and the problems existing in the Russian 
northwestern and southern regions. It is important to see whether the regional cooperation 
networks are structurally equipped to tackling such problems. A high level of cross-cutting 
intersectoral ties would be an indicator of networks’ flexibility and effectiveness in 
turbulent regional environments. According to Sorensen and Torfing (2005), if actors from 
different sectors are equally involved in the decision-making processes, they will tend to 
develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for the decisions, which will oblige 
them to support, rather than hamper, their implementation. 
Figures 7 and 8 display the results of the intersectoral analysis. Each network was 
rotated in a way to represent regional cooperation sectors grouped together and linkages 
among them. 
 
-Figure 7 here- 
-Figure 8 here- 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that in the southern regional cooperation 
network there is the lack of cross-cutting ties in the system and some sectors of 
cooperation are disconnected. In addition, in accordance with the previous findings, public 
sector actors occupy dominant position in the system by having strong links to all the other 
sectors thereby controlling the system. As far as the northwestern regional cooperation 
network is concerned, it had higher level of cross-cutting ties than the southern network in 
1999, and in 2006 it developed into a very cohesive system with more or less evenly 
distributed strong intersectoral linkages. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that in the northwestern region regional 
integration processes are effective and efficient, while in the southern region high level of 
centralization of political control over cooperation processes poses the principal obstacle 
to greater sub-national regionalism. 
 
Strength of cooperative effort 
 
Based on the models used in information theory and electrical engineering, I 
developed a method to evaluate the strength of cooperative effort of the regional 
cooperation networks. For characterizing the strength of cooperative effort, I use the 
normalized entropy of the probability mass function induced by the distribution of 
cooperation initiatives among organizations in the network, which is defined for a network 
as follows:  
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j i N ,  is the number of cooperation initiatives between organization i and organization j, S 
is the size of the network (total number of nodes in the network), τ  is  a  normalized 
measure of the strength of cooperative efforts ranging from 0 to 1. τ  is 0 when there is 
only one link in the whole network (assuming network always has at least 1 link).τ  is 1 
when there are links of equal strength established between every pair of organizations in 
the network, implying that network forms a complete graph, or in other words, is fully and 
equally connected.  
It is important to note that the distribution of link strengths plays extremely 
important role in determining the value of τ . In the extreme situation when all the pairs in 
the network are connected by weak ties and there is one very strong tie, τ  will still be 
very close to zero indicating low effectiveness of the cooperative efforts. In other words, 
uniformity of the distribution of link strengths in the system determines the strength of 
cooperative effort of the system. Table 7 reports the scores for the strength of cooperative 
activity in the regional cooperation networks. 
 
-Table 7 here- 
 
According to the results of the analysis, the strength of cooperative activity grows 
in both networks. However, in the northwestern network, the strength of cooperative 
activity is significantly higher and the difference between the 1999 value (0.50) and the 
2006 value (0.69) is bigger than the difference between the southern networks scores (0.25 
in 1999 and 0.34 in 2006). This implies that the strength of cooperative effort increases 
faster in the northwestern network and therefore, the northwestern system has better 
cooperative dynamics. 
To illustrate the development and evolution of cooperative processes in the system, 
I model Smooth Cooperative Effort Strength Field in MATLAB program. 
Smoothing is performed using Gaussian kernel to facilitate visual attractivity of the data. 
The values of pixels in the field are described by the following formula: 
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Where  ) , ( l k N   is the number of cooperation initiatives between organization k and 
organization l,  ) , ( j i I   is the cooperative efforts strength between organization i and 
organization j, σ  is the smoothing parameter and C is the normalization constant: 
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S is the size of the network (total number of nodes in the network).    16
Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12 depict visualized representations of Smooth Cooperative Effort 
Strength Field of regional cooperation networks modeled in MATLAB program.  
 
-Figure 9 here- 
-Figure 10 here- 
-Figure 11 here- 
-Figure 12 here- 
 
The results of the analysis indicate that the strength of cooperative effort increases 
in both networks over time; however, in the northwestern network it increases faster and it 
is much more evenly distributed across the system. This implies that in the northwestern 
network more actors are engaged in cooperative effort with many other actors and 
therefore, have access to information about processes occurring within different policy 
sectors and capability to influence regional events. The strength of cooperative effort 
indicates better awareness of regional processes, bigger openness of the whole system, and 
better participation, mobilization, and adaptation capabilities of the northwestern actors.  
Additionally, as discussed previously, decentralization and participation strengthen 
governance and build social capital in society. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that 
due to the structural peculiarities of the networks, the northwestern network generates 
social capital more intensely and has a stronger effect on democratic governance.    
 
Factors explaining agents’ degree of power and centrality in the networks 
The analysis has been so far focused on the structural peculiarities of the southern 
and northwestern regional cooperation networks. In the course of the analysis significant 
structural differences and network development tendencies were discovered and their 
implications for the functioning of the networks and the overall network effects on 
democratic governance and policy processes in the regions were discussed. 
It is important to understand the factors that explain the positions of power and 
centrality in the regional cooperation networks. It is hypothesized that an actor’s degree of 
centrality and power in the northwestern cooperation network is a function of its size, 
alliance proactiveness, level of activity in local environment, and international competence.  
Size is defined as the total number of people working for an organization. Bigger 
organizations might have more contacts with other organizations (both formal and 
informal), and therefore may have better awareness of opportunities provided by regional 
cooperation. It may also happen that European actors might be interested in involving 
bigger partners in projects and initiatives because of trust and reliability issues: they might 
have better knowledge about bigger regional actors than smaller ones.  
Alliance proactiveness is defined as the total number of partners. If an organization 
is already engaged in partnerships with other organizations, there might be a better chance 
that it will get engaged in collaboration with other actors in the regional cooperation 
framework. The level of activity in local environment is defined as the number of public 
events organized by an actor during the period of time of one year. And international 
competence is defined as the level of engagement in international activity of any kind- 
whether having international partners, or participating in exchanges, conferences or other 
events, or having strategic international partners. International competence was measured 
on a 3-point scale- ‘0’ for no competence, ‘1’ for moderate competence and ‘2’ for high 
competence.   17
It is hypothesized that power and centrality of an actor in the southern cooperation 
network depends on its size, budget/income, and whether it comes from the public sector. 
Public sector variable was coded as ‘1’. All the other sectors were coded as ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’, 
etc. 
For the first dependent variable- centrality- degree centrality measure was chosen. 
Degree centrality was chosen as a measure of most advantageous position in the network 
in terms of network resource exchange and information flows. Degree centrality indicates 
how many other network actors are in direct contact with a particular actor. The more 
nodes connecting to an actor, the higher is its degree, and therefore, the greater the 
potential to be in the center of events and other network exchange processes (e.g. 
information flows, financial flows, activities).  
The second dependent variable- power- was defined as an eigenvector centrality 
measure. As discussed previously, actors connected to more actors tend to be more central. 
But this measure
 does not account for differences in the centrality of one’s partners. Actors 
who are connected to many well connected actors are more powerful than those who are 
connected to an identical
 number of poorly connected actors. In other words, those who
 are 
in contact with well-connected or ‘popular’ actors will tend to be more central than those
 
who are connected to the unpopular. I use eigenvector centrality to
 capture this aspect. 
This measure assumes that the centrality
 of a given actor is an increasing function of the 
sum of all
 the centralities of all the actors with whom an actor is connected.  
 
Therefore, the models for the analysis are described as follows: 
 
 
Power 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income+  e  
 
Power 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income +  e  
 
Centrality 1999 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income + e  
 
Centrality 2006 = ß0 + ß1Size + ß2Activity + ß3 Alliance+ ß4 Competence + ß5 Sector + ß6Budget/Income + e  
 
Multiple regression method was used to estimate the significance and the effect of 
the parameters discussed above on the position of centrality and power in the networks. 
Tables 8 and 9 report the results of the analysis.  
 
-Table 8 here- 
-Table 9 here- 
 
The results indicate that the size of an actor, the budget/income, and sector 
orientation (whether an  actor belonged to the public sector) were statistically significant 
factors that had a positive effect on the position of centrality and power in the 1999 
southern network. High coefficient for the sector orientation was expected from the 
previous analysis and goes in line with the previous findings. In 2006 southern network, 
size, budget/income and sector orientation are still statistically significant positive 
predictors of an actor’s centrality and power in the network. Interestingly, in 2006, the 
level of an actor’s local activity became a significant positive predictor of centrality and 
power. This may indicate that when an actor is engaged in cooperative networking 
processes, it may acquire support from like-minded organizations and gain strength and   18
popularity in the region by active participation in the life of the local community and 
organization of various events and activities. Therefore, over time public sector actors will 
have to start taking such ‘popular’ regional actors into account, thereby creating conditions 
for the increase in their centrality and power in the regional cooperation infrastructure. 
As far as the northwestern network is concerned, in 1999, statistically significant 
positive predictors of an actor’s centrality were the size of an actor, alliance proactiveness, 
international competence, and sector orientation. Statistically significant positive 
coefficients for the sector orientation (economic sector) were expected from the previous 
analysis and go in line with the previous findings indicating that in the northwestern 
region in 1999 the central aspect of regional cooperation was economic integration. 
Budget/income and the level of local activity turned out insignificant variables in 
predicting actor centrality and power in the northwestern 1999 network. In the 2006 
network, power and centrality were dependent on the alliance proactiveness, international 
competence, and local activity variables. Size, sector orientation and budget/income turned 
out insignificant. 
The findings indicate interesting tendencies in the regions. The probability that an 
actor becomes central in the regional cooperation with the EU in the northwestern region 
is highly dependent on its international competence and alliance proactiveness implying 
that the overall level of networking and outreach capabilities and mobility of an actor are 
important in determining whether it will occupy a central and powerful position in the 
regional cooperation process. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the northwestern 
actors are oriented towards sub-national integration. In the southern network, centrality 
and power are more a function of local factors indicating that Russian southern actors are 
more oriented towards internal regional arena rather than external integrative processes.    
 
Conclusion 
 
The results of the network analysis of the regional cooperation structures in the 
northwestern and southern regions indicate significant regional differences that have 
important implications for democratic governance in the regions. The analysis 
demonstrated that regional cooperation with the EU plays a significant positive role in 
creating connections among Russian local organizations, NGOs, companies, educational 
institutions, and provincial governments in both northwestern and southern regions. 
However, due to the peculiarities of the regional structures, regional cooperation with the 
EU has a stronger effect on the development of an interconnected regional infrastructure in 
the northwestern region.  
According to the analysis, the northwest region, which has higher level of 
democratic governance, is embedded in a dense and decentralized network governance 
structure. On the contrary, southern region happened to have sparsely connected, largely 
fragmented, and highly centralized regional cooperation structure. Northwestern regional 
cooperation network showed the prevalence of horizontal modes of decision-making, 
while southern network happened to be vertically differentiated. The results of the analysis 
indicate that in the northwestern network there is a fairly equal distribution of power, 
influence and control among network participants; therefore, the northwestern network 
approximates a good network governance model based on self-organization, adaptability, 
mobility, and collective action. This indicates efficiency in the regional integration 
processes in the northwestern area.  
In the southern region, the public sector actors are dominating decision-making 
processes and control integration processes occurring in the regions, which significantly   19
impedes regional information diffusion and resource exchanges. In the southern 
cooperation structure high level of centralization of political control over cooperation 
processes poses the principal obstacle to greater sub-national regionalism. 
Another important difference between the northwestern and the southern region is 
that in the northwestern region, regional cooperation network has a much higher level of 
intersectoral cross-cutting ties, which indicates that the northwestern regional structure is 
richer in social capital and is also more participatory, open, and democratically legitimate 
than the southern one. High level of cross-cutting ties in the system also indicates its 
effectiveness, mobility and adaptivity to evolving complex regional social, economic, and 
environmental problems.  
Another important finding is that the level of centrality and power in the 
northwestern network (among other factors) depends on an actor’s alliance proactiveness 
and international competence, which implies that networking capabilities and knowledge 
of transregional and international environment are important factors in determining 
whether an actor will get engaged in the regional cooperation infrastructure and become 
central and influential in it. In the southern region, interorganizational power and 
centrality are functions of local factors. This indicates that actors in the northwestern 
region are more motivated and inclined to cooperate with international actors and most 
important, already have significant international experience. On the contrary, actors in the 
southern region are more oriented towards local action arena.  
The main goal of this study was to discover the main tendencies and the patterns of 
governance in the regional cooperation systems and discuss their implications for 
democratic governance and sub-national integration in the northwestern and southern 
regions of the Russian Federation. The dimension that was neglected in this analysis is the 
micro-level of individual organizations and individuals. This aspect was ignored not 
because it is considered to be of less importance, but because this study has been 
specifically focused on a comparative assessment of the systemic features of the regional 
cooperation. However, this is a serious limitation of the study as it analyzes structural 
properties of the systems and their effects, but does not explain why the networks have 
these structural configurations and why these significant differences in structure exist. The 
actual configuration and functioning of the regional cooperation networks depend on the 
regional contexts in which they emerge and operate, and thorough examination of regional 
historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors that may help to explain structural peculiarities 
of the networks is necessary. Regional experts are needed to provide a context for the 
study. Explaining regional cooperation network differences is my current research area.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   20
Figures and Tables 
     
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
   21
 
 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
NETWORK CENTRALIZATION (N = 100)
a 
 Centralization   
Southern Cooperation Network 1999  61.32% 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006  59.58% 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999  32.17% 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006  15.22% 
a The closer the centralization is to 100%, the more centralized the network. 
Table 1 
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Southern Cooperation Network 1999 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized)  
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Krasnodar gov (71)  Krasnodar gov (42.1)  Rostov gov (0.45)  Krasnodar gov (64) 
 Rostov gov (63)  Rostov gov (28.3)  Krasnodar gov (0.44)  Rostov gov (61) 
Stavropol gov (41)  Stavropol gov (26.2)  Stavropol gov (0.24)  Stavropol gov (56) 
Astrakhan gov (40)  Astrakhan gov (22.7)  Astrakhan gov (0.18)  Astrakhan gov (56) 
Maikop gov (25)  Maikop gov (10.1)  Maikop gov (0.15)  Elista gov (53) 
Cherkessk gov (18)  Cherkessk gov (8.3)  Cherkessk gov (0.13)  Cherkessk gov (52) 
Elista gov (18)  Elista gov (6.5)  Elista gov (0.12)  Maikop gov (52) 
Nalchik gov (16)  Nalchik gov (5.9)  Kuban university (0.09)  Vlad gov (51) 
Kuban University (15)  Vlad gov (2.4)  Nalchik gov (0.08)  Nalchik gov (49) 
Vlad gov (12)  Kuban University  (1.9)  Vlad gov (0.07)  Stavr  University 
(46) 
 Southern Cooperation Network 2006 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Krasnodar gov (78)  Krasnodar gov (41.3)  Krasnodar gov (0.48)  Krasnodar gov (66) 
 Rostov gov (73)  Rostov gov (27.3)  Rostov gov (0.46)  Rostov gov (63) 
Stavropol gov (71)  Stavropol gov (26.2)  Stavropol gov (0.25)  Stavropol gov (58) 
Astrakhan gov (56)  Astrakhan gov (24.7)   Astrakhan gov (0.22)  Astrakhan gov (56) 
Elista gov (33)  Elista gov (14.4)  Maikop gov (0.18)  Elista gov (54) 
Cherkessk gov (25)  Region obr (12.2)  Cherkessk gov (0.15)  Cherkessk gov (54) 
Kuban University (18)  Cherkessk gov (10.1)  Elista gov (0.13)  Maikop gov (53) 
Maikop gov (16)  Maikop gov (7.5)  Assotsiatsia NKO (0.12)  Vlad gov (51) 
Region obr (15)  Kuban University  (2.4)  Kuban University (0.12)  Nalchik gov (50) 
Ekologika (14)  Ekologika (1.9)  Vlad gov (0.08)  Ekonom (48) 
Table 2 
 
 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999 
Degree centrality indexes  Betweenness  Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes 
Transphere (31)  Transphere (20.3)  Transphere (0.21)  Transphere (41) 
Vneshtorgbank (29)  Vneshtorgbank (19.2)  Vneshtorgbank (0.19)  Vneshtorgbank (40) 
ATV (25)  ATV (17.2)  St University (0.17)  ATV (40) 
St University (24)  NCMB (14.5)  NCMB (0.15)  Logist part (37) 
NCMB (21)  Assotsiatsia sots org (13.8)  ATV (0.15)  Vneshtorgbank (35) 
St Petersburg gov (19)  St University (11.9)  St Petersburg gov (0.12)  St  Petersburg  gov 
(31) 
Novgorod gov (18)  St Petersburg gov (10.5)  Logist part (0.11)  Novgorod gov (29) 
Logist part (16)  Logist part (9.8)  Novgorod gov (0.09)  St University (27) 
Assotsiatsia sots org (15)  Novgorod gov (7.3)  Assotsiatsia  sots  org 
(0.07) 
Assotsiatsia sots org 
(25) 
RSB (14)  Shkola prav (5.1)  RSB (0.06)  RSB (21) 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006 
Degree centrality 
indexes 
Betweenness Centrality 
indexes (normalized) 
Eigenvector Centrality 
indexes  
Closeness centrality 
indexes   23
North-West Assoc (17)  North-West Assoc (9.2)  North-West Assoc (0.13)  North-West Assoc (25) 
Econ Dev (16)  Econ Dev (8.4)  Econ Dev (0.11)  Econ Dev (23) 
Cult Init (16)  Cult Init (7.9)  Cult Init (0.11)  Cult Init (22) 
Sev prirodoohran (14)  Sev prirodoohran (7.6)  Sev prirodoohran (0.09)  Transphere (19) 
St University (13)  St University (7.3)  Transphere (0.08)  Journalism CT (18) 
Petrozavodsk Univ (12)  Journalism CT (7.1)  Journalism CT (0.08)  Sev prirodoohran (18) 
Resource Center (12)  Transphere (6.9)  Resource Center (0.07)  St University (17) 
Journalism CT (11)  Petrozavodsk Univ (6.7)  St University (0.06)  Petrozavodsk Univ (15) 
Transphere (10)  Resource Center (6.4)  Petrozavodsk  Univ 
(0.06) 
Resource Center (14) 
St Petersburg gov (9)  St Petersburg gov (6.1)  KulturKontakt (0.05)  St Petersburg gov (11.1) 
Table 3 
NETWORK DENSITY (N = 100)
a 
 Density   
Southern Cooperation Network 1999  7.03 % 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006  10.27 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999  13.32 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006  36.67 % 
a The closer the density is to 100%, the denser the network. 
Table 4 
 
NETWORK TRANSITIVITY (N = 100) 
 Transitivity   
Southern Cooperation Network 1999  14 % 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006  21 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999  48 % 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006  81 % 
Table 5 
 
NETWORK COMPACTNESS (DISTANCE-BASED COHESION) INDEXES (N = 100)
a 
 Compactness  Indexes 
Southern Cooperation Network 1999  0.332 
Southern Cooperation Network 2006  0.344 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 1999  0.546 
Northwestern Cooperation Network 2006  0.620 
a range 0 to 1; larger values indicate greater cohesiveness. 
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0.25 
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Figure 9: Cooperative effort field/Southern Network 1999 
 
Figure 10: Cooperative effort field /Southern Network 2006   27
 
Figure 11: Cooperative effort field /Northwestern Network 1999 
 
Figure 12: Cooperative effort field /Northwestern Network 2006   28
 
  Size Level  of   
Activity 
Alliance 
proactiveness 
Sector International 
Competence 
Budget/Income 
Centrality  
1999 
0.31* 0.12  0.36  ‘1’-0.74**  0.  27  0.19* 
Power 
1999 
0.28*  0.09  0. 24  ‘1’-0.67*  0. 23  0.15* 
Centrality 
2006 
0.34* 0.13*  0.43  ‘1’-0.62* 0.29  0.14* 
Power 
2006 
0.30* 0.10*  0.37  ‘1’-0.44* 0.25  0.08* 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
Table 8: Southern Network 
 
  Size Level  of   
Activity 
Alliance 
proactiveness 
Sector International 
Competence 
Budget/Income 
Centrality  
1999 
0.12* 0.34  0.27**  ‘2’-0.37**  0.42**  0.31 
Power 
1999 
0.07* 0.31  0.24*  ‘2’-0.32**  0.40*  0.29 
Centrality 
2006 
0.13 0.26*  0.32*  none  0.37*  0.25 
Power 
2006 
0.10 0.28*  0.30*  none  0.35*  0.19 
 
 
*   significant at the .05 alpha level 
** significant at the .01 alpha level 
 
Table 9: Northwestern Network 
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